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The debate about a reform of the international investment agreement (IIA) regime is 
gaining momentum.
1
 One suggestion currently being discussed is the establishment of 
an appellate body for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases, as a means to 
review first instance awards, thereby enhancing the coherence and predictability of 
jurisprudence and contributing to legal security.
2
 However, more discussion is needed 
on how such a body could be set up, and to what extent it could achieve its purpose.  
 
One option is to establish a standing appellate body as exists for trade disputes under 
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.
3
 The second is an ad hoc appellate body, 
following the example of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Dispute (ICSID) regarding the annulment of arbitral awards. Either type of appellate 
body would not only have the right to annul awards, but also to amend them.  
 
The first option implies the establishment of a new multilateral institution or the 
opening up of the WTO dispute-settlement system to ISDS; both ideas lack political 
support and are therefore unrealistic; however, a permanent court could be an option 
at the bilateral or regional level. 
 
The second option means that an appellate body would convene only as need arises in 
relation to a specific dispute. Contrary to a standing appellate body, members of an ad 
hoc appellate body would vary from case-to-case.
4
 While a hierarchical structure 





Such a body could be set up multilaterally, e.g., by an amendment to the existing 
ICSID Convention
6
 or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, as suggested in a recent 
Perspective,
7
 or in bilateral or regional investment agreements. While amending 
existing multilateral conventions would be extremely difficult, the second alternative 
would be easier to realize, especially with regard to future IIAs.  
 
Matters look different with regard to the more than 3,200 existing IIAs. At the all-
time peak of IIA-making in the mid-1990s, approximately 200 treaties were 
negotiated per year. At that rate, it would take at least 16 years to incorporate an 
appellate body into all these treaties, but this may still be an optimistic scenario given 
 2 
the high complexity of today's IIA negotiations. In the end, an amendment to the 
ICSID Convention or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules - if successful - may be more 
efficient. Without embarking on one of these two reform paths, the introduction of an 
appellate body in new IIAs would remain piecemeal. 
 
Certainly, a serious shortcoming of an ad hoc appellate body - independent of whether 
it is based on a bilateral, regional or multilateral treaty - is its limited ability to 
promote coherence in treaty interpretation.
8
 Since none of these tribunals would have 
supremacy over the others, there would be a considerable risk that different ad hoc 
appellate bodies would decide the same legal issue differently, thus perpetuating a 
common drawback in current arbitration practice. This risk would exist both with 
regard to a consistent interpretation of one and the same IIA, and in respect of similar 
IIA provisions deriving from different treaties.  
  
In conclusion, it appears that inclusion into future IIAs would be the fastest way 
toward an appellate body in ISDS.
9
 An ad hoc tribunal could review decisions of the 
first instance and thereby address a major concern of critics of the existing arbitration 
system. However, for promoting the equally important objective of coherence and 
predictability in international arbitration practice, it would need a permanent appellate 
body with broad jurisdiction over the existing IIA regime. 
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